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FM USEU BRUSSELS  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY  
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY  
RUCNMEU/EU INTEREST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY  
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY  
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY  
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY  
RUEAORC/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY  
RUEADRO/HQ ICE DRO WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY  
RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY  
RUCPDOG/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY  
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY  
RHMFISS/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY  
RUEKJCS/DOD WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 000537

SIPDIS NOFORN

STATE FOR P, S/SAGSWA, NEA/IR, ISN, EEB/ESC, S/CT, L, EUR, INL TREASURY FOR TFFC, TFI, OIA EU POSTS FOR IRAN WATCHERS AND TFCOS

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SUBJECT: IRAN SANCTIONS: AA/S GLASER CONSULTS KEY AMBASSADORS IN BRUSSELS REF: A. BRUSSELS 205 B. BRUSSELS 41 C. 2008 BRUSSELS 1468 D. BRUSSELS

Classified By: USEU EconMinCouns Peter Chase for reasons 1.4 (b), (d), (e).

[1](#)1. (S//NF) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: On March 2 and 3 Acting Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Daniel Glaser briefed EU-27 non-proliferation and

[1](#)1. The minority opposed to revising EU Iran sanctions includes Austria, Spain, Sweden, Luxembourg, Cyprus, Greece, Portugal, and perhaps Romar

[1](#)2. (S//NF) AA/S Glaser's separate conversations with key EU stakeholders underscored that Iran sanctions are one of the most sensitive and cor

----- Bilateral Side Meetings: EU Advice on Common Refrains -----

[1](#)3. (SBU) In advance of the formal presentation to the EU-27, on March 2 and 3 Treasury AA/S Danny Glaser, Treasury Policy Advisor Timothy Dore

Missing U.S. Voice Needed to Get EU Decision On Track -----

[1](#)4. (S//NF) All interlocutors underscored the significance of the U.S. delegation's presentation to all 27 EUMS. Czech Presidency PSC Ambassad

[1](#)5. (C//NF) German PSC Ambassador Clements von Goetze also noted that this extraordinary large format briefing was the most efficient way of er

Single Out but Understand the EU Foot-Draggers -----

[1](#)6. (C//NF) The Czechs (please protect) and Brits both suggested that the USG should seek to bilaterally "single out" and "isolate" EU sanctor

[1](#)7. (C//NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX(strictly protect) noted that Sweden's negative stance had lent other EU sanctions opponents credibility. This "group c

[1](#)8. (C//NF) Other UK contacts (please protect) noted that in recent EU debates, it became clear that the "problematic" EU countries did not gre

Timing is an Issue -----

[1](#)9. (C//NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX (please protect) worried that the EU would await the outcome of the U.S. policy review in April, then the P5 1 letter

"Legal" vs. "Aspirational" -----

[1](#)10. (C//NF) Cooper lamented that the collective EU culture views decision-making through an excessively legalistic lens, rather than a "great

Spain and Sweden: Bilateral Consultations Count -----

[1](#)11. (C//NF) The delegation met separately with Spain and Sweden, two countries seen as linchpins to the "no" contingent, in advance to preview

[1](#)12. (C) Both the Spanish and Swedish PSC Ambassadors evinced skepticism about the results thus far of the P5 1 process and the dual track appr

[1](#)13. (C) The Spanish Ambassador asserted that persuading Iran to stop its nuclear quest would require "transparency, trust, confidence, and ver

[1](#)14. (C) AA/S Glaser agreed that tone was important but stressed the need for the right balance on substance during this vanishing window of o

[1](#)15. (C) Glaser readily agreed that Russia and China were very important on this issue; their flexibility in the previous week's FATF statement

Commission Role, Analysis, and Questions -----

[1](#)16. (C) Commission (DG RELEX) interlocutors downplayed their role in the Iran sanctions debate, asserting that their role is mostly limited to

[1](#)17. (C//NF) Comment: Indicative of how little attention the Commission pays to its responsibility for monitoring EU sanctions implementation,

[1](#)18. (U) AA/S Glaser has cleared this message. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED MURRAY .